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NOTES
THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE REGULATION OF
SEXUAL CONDUCT
The opinion is often expressed by some writers that existing sex laws
should be more stringently enforced and should be backed up with broader
restrictive measures.' Other commentators, considering what they term
the realities of sex conduct as uncovered through extensive research,
contend that the strictures governing sex conduct are outmoded and
unrealistic.2 For them human conduct simply is not amenable to such
regulation.3 The merits of both these vocal positions deserve examination.
The purpose of this note is to make such an analysis in the area of
those laws aimed at proscribing, inter alia, obscenities, lewdness, indecent
and immoral conduct and lascivious behavior. These laws form a great
part of the criminal legislation of every state and are generally catalogued
as "offenses against religion, conscience, morals and decency."4  The
1. For a most outspoken exposition of this belief, see Harpster, Obscene Literature,
34 MARQ. L. REV. 301 (1951). The writer sees this country in a "process of moral dis-
integration" which precedes the fall of all great nations. He deals with modern literature
as one of the ". . . causes of America's moral weakness. . . ." Ibid.
2. See KINSEY, POMEROY AND MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE
(1948). These writers see no reason for a continued reliance upon the ". . . theologic
classifications and . . . moral pronouncements of the English common law of the
fifteenth century." Id. at 202. The laws are seen as setting an ideal standard out of
context with the actual behavior of people as this behavior is borne out by statistical
analysis. Id. at 392.
For critical reviews of the first Kinsey report see Horack, Sex Offenses and Scientific
Investigation, 44 ILL. L. REv. 149 (1949); Burling, Book Review, 23 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv.
540 (1948); Holcomb, Book Review, 38 J. OF CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 687 (1948);
Schwartz, Book Review, 96 U. OF PA. L. REv. 914 (1948).
See also KINSEY, POMEROY, MARTIN AND GEBHARD, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR OF THE
HUMAN FEMALE (1953), the companion volume of the first Kinsey report. For a series
of critical analyses of this work, see SEX LIFE OF THE AMERICAN WOMAN AND THE
KNSEY REPoRT. (Ellis ed. 1953).
3. The contention is that a great deal of our sex regulation is based on outmoded
social conventions.
For a very outspoken denunciation of our sex conventions see, GuYoN, THE ETHICS
OF SEXUAL Acts (J. C. & Ingeborg Flugel's Translation 1943). Guyon, who wrote in
the late twenties, advocated minimal regulation of sex conduct in a manner similar
to the Kinsey researchers. Both recognized the need for an intelligent attitude toward
sexual matters on the part of the participants. Kinsey points out the facts of sexual
behavior, but other writers indicate that there is need for more than a recognition that
sexual conduct is not intrinsically bad. An emotionally mature attitude toward sex is
essential. To the emotionally mature ". . . sex . . . is . . . neither noble nor
shameful, but a need to be temperately fulfilled." Freeman, Sex and Emotional Health,
in SEX LIFE OF THE AMERICAN WOMAN AND) THE KINSEY REPORT 68 (Ellis ed. 1953).
4. For a comprehensive consideration of this country's statutory sex laws, see
SHERWIN, SEX AND THE STATUTORY LAW (1949).
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unifying thread which ties these laws together, beside the fact that all
seek, more or less, to eliminate public manifestations of the sexual aspect
of human life, is their vagueness and broadness of coverage which lends
them a possibly wide application at the discretion of enforcement officers
and gives them an illusory quality.' It is this type of legislation which
tends to undermine one of the basic principles of criminal law in a
democratic state, i.e., no punishment without a law,6 as opposed to the
totalitarian concept of no offense wihout a punishment.'
The statutes considered here are aimed at regulating voluntary sexual
and sex-related conduct as well as minor offenses as opposed to those
dealing with violent sexual crimes, e.g., common law rape. These laws
encompass widely divergent types of human behavior which are generally
considered offensive or dangerous to our society. Minors are required
to deport themselves in a manner both decent and moral ;S adults are not
5. "Lawyers and judges are . . . cognizant of the law's shortcomings in its con-
fused semantics, vague standards relating to sex-law objectives, uneven results and general
illogic and ineffectiveness." DRUMMOND, THE SEXUAL PARADOX 88 (1953).
SHERWIN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 13-22, discusses what he terms the catchall type
of law directed toward a general proscription of conduct not under the condemnation of
specific statutes.
A noted writer of the eighteenth century commented on the illusory quality of such
laws, phrased in generalities, and aimed often at the prohibition of nonexistent harms.
2 BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION (Translated and edited from the French of
Dumont by Atkinson, 1914 ed.).
6. See HALL, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW c. 2 (1947). The author discusses the
origin and development of this basic principle of criminal law. He notes certain areas of
the criminal law which have laid little claim to specificity, e.g., laws dealing with
vagabonds, but he makes only a limited attempt to justify and explain this departure
from the definiteness requirement. Id. at 47-49.
7. Id. at 41. The writer discusses the departure from the principle of legality in
totalitarian states. He makes reference to a German law enacted under the Nazi regime
in 1935 which provided: "Any person who commits an act which the law declares to be
punishable or which is deserving of penalty according to the fundamental conceptions
of a penal law and sound popular feeling, shall be punished. If there is no penal law
directly covering an act it shall be punished under the law which the fundamental con-
ception applies most nearly to the said act." Id. at 42 n.55. A similar Russian law of
1926 states: "A crime is any socially dangerous act or omission which threatens the
foundations of the Soviet political structure. . . . In cases where the Criminal Code
makes no direct reference to particular forms of crime . . . other measures of social
protection are applied in accordance with those Articles of the Criminal Code which deal
with crimes most approximating, in gravity, and in kind, to the crimes actually com-
mitted. . . ." Ibid.
See also Ludwig, Control of the Sex Criminal, 25 ST. JOHNS L. REv. 203 (1951).
This writer points out that anything less than a clear statutory definition of sex crimes
tends to the "totalitarian doctrine that there can be no wrong committed against the
state which is incapable of being punished." Id. at 211.
Ambiguous and vague laws lend themselves to use as a repressive and dictatorial
device as is pointed out by one writer commenting on the position of the negro in the
Southern states. I MYRDAL, THE AMERICAN DILEMMA 537, 562 (1942).
8. Juvenile delinquency laws generally attempt to regulate the "morality" of
children. Indiana's law provides that a child under eighteen is delinquent if he "uses
vile, obscene, . . . indecent language," or "is guilty of indecent or immoral conduct,"
or if he "deports himself so as to wilfully injure or endanger the morals or health of
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to cause a child to be guilty of violating these commands.' Behavior
between adults which is "lewd and indecent" is almost universally out-
lawed either by statutes directed squarely at such conducte' or more
himself or others." IND. ANN. STAT. §10-4210 (Burns Supp. 1953).
There are similar provisions in other states. See ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 37, §.089 (1936)
(indecent or lascivious conduct) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. §16-1701 (Supp. 1953) (deports self
so as to injure or endanger morals of self or others) ; TEX. STAT. art. 2338-1(3) (1948)
(habitual conduct tending to endanger morals of self or others); UTAH CODE ANN. §55-
10-6 (1953) (deports self so as to endanger the morals or health of himself or others) ;
ALA. CODE tit. 13, §350 (1940) (guilty of immoral conduct or leading idle, lewd, dissolute
life) ; DE. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §1101 (1953) (acts tending to endanger morals or health
of self or others).
One basic variation is typified by the Oklahoma provision that states a child is
delinquent if he is "guilty of immoral conduct in any public place or about any school
house." (emphasis added) OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, §101 (1951). The accent here is on the
public character of the immoral conduct. The Idaho provision was similar to the
Oklahoma law but was recently amended to include conduct whether or not it is public.
In an Illinois case involving the crime of contributing to the delinquency of a
minor, the court ruled that an indictment alleging that the defendant was guilty of sexual
relations with the child sufficiently charged the crime. People v. Kohler, 413 Il1. 283,
109 N.E.2d 210 (1952). The court stated: "The term 'sexual relations' . . . imports
such wrongful and improper conduct as would tend to render a child guilty of indecent
and lascivious conduct and thus delinquent. . . ." Id. at 285, 109 N.E.2d at 211.
Any kind of sexual conduct on the part of the child tends to render him or her
delinquent. For an interesting portrayal of juvenile delinquency sex provisions in action,
see IMLER, A STUDY OF 35 JUVENILE SEX OFFENDERS KNOWN TO THE MARION COUNTY
JUVENILE COURT (Unpublished Thesis in Indiana University Library, 1950). See also
DRUMMOND, op. Cit. supra note 5, c. 5.
9. This is the crime of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. Indiana makes
it unlawful for an adult to commit any act which would cause or tend to cause delinquency
as defined elsewhere in the laws. There is also a catchall provision against adults
causing "any such boy or girl to be guilty of vicious or immoral conduct." IND. ANN.
STAT. §10-812 (Burns Supp. 1953). This state also provides for the felony of enticing
a female under 17 into an immoral place "for vicious or immoral purposes." This is
punishable by sentence of from two to fourteen years. IND. ANN. STAT. §10-4210 (Burns
1933). It is further provided that the fact that the man has entered an immoral place with
a girl shall constitute prima facie evidence of criminal intent.
See the laws of other states as to the crime of contributing to the delinquency of a
minor. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 37, §.090 (1936) ; N.Y. PENAL LAW §483; TEX. STAT., PEN.
CODE art. 534 (1948). The New York provision makes it a misdemeanor for anyone to
cause or permit a child under sixteen to have its life placed in danger or its morals
depraved or to cause or permit such a child to be placed in a situation where its life
is likely to be endangered or its morals likely to be impaired. This law is broad enough
to take in any act which might now or in the future be considered harmful to a child.
Pennsylvania makes it a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment up to three years
to commit any act which "corrupts or tends to corrupt the morals of any child under
the age of eighteen years." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §4532 (Supp. 1953).
The Louisiana Code provides that it is a crime for any person to cause or entice a
child under seventeen to "perform any sexually immoral act." LA. CODE CRitm. LAW &
PRoc. ANN., art. 92, §7 (Supp. 1952). This act had formerly read that it would be an
offense to cause such a child to commit any immoral act. The Louisiana Supreme Court
found this void for vagueness since the word "immoral" was too all inclusive. State v.
Vallery, 212 La. 1095, 34 So.2d 329 (1948). The addition of the word "sexually" was
the legislative answer to the request for specificity.
10. For a general discussion of this type of legislation, see SHERWIN, op. cit. supra
note 4, at 21 et seq. Typical of this kind of statute is the New Jersey provision to the
effect that "[a]ny person who shall be guilty of open lewdness, or any notorious act
of public indecency, grossly scandalous and tending to debauch the morals and manners
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general legislation dealing with vagrancy," disorderly conduct, " and
of the people or who shall in private be guilty of any act of lewdness or carnal indecency
with another, grossly scandalous and tending to debauch the morals and manners of the
people, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." N.J. REv. STAT. §2:140-1 (1937).
Under the common law, lewdness was no offense unless committed openly. Coleman
v. Commonwealth, 247 S.W.2d 535 (Ky. 1952). In that ease a negro convicted of common
law lewdness was acquitted because of the state's failure to prove acts of public indecency.
But see Koa Gora v. Territory of Hawaii, 152 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1946). In this case
a territorial statute prohibiting "lascivious conduct" was ruled to apply to both public
and private acts of indecency.
A New Jersey case construing the law quoted above acknowledged the legislature's
endeavor to reach private acts of indecency but ruled that only those private acts which
were "grossly scandalous and tending to debauch the morals and manners . . ." came
within the intendment of the act. The court required the element of public nuisance.
State v. Brenner, 132 N.J.L. 607, 41 A.2d 532 (1945). This case contains a discussion of
the development of common law lewdness.
The laws of the various states are generally phrased in terms of "open lewdness or
any notorious acts tending, to debauch the morals of the people." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§4519 (1939); FLA. STAT. §798.02 (1951). They often refer to: "lewd and lascivious
cohabitation" or "any open and notorious act of public indecency," Mo. STAT. ANN.
§563.150 (Vernon 1949); to acts constituting public indecency and tending to debauch
the morals of the people, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §22 (1951) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. §18-
4101 (1947); or to acts of indecent or obscene nature before women or children. IND.
ANN. STAT. §10-2801 (Burns Supp. 1953).
For a discussion of these laws as affected by the first Kinsey report see, Note, Post-
Kifnsey: Voluntary Sex Relations As Criminal Offenses, 17 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 162
(1949). The author of the note lists eighteen states which have a statutory offense of
lewdness. Id. at 166, table 1.
11. Vagrancy statutes in many states serve the purpose of, among other things, a
catchall sex offender law. The vagrant is often defined as a "lewd, wanton and lascivious
person." FLA. STAT. §856.02 (1951). Other enactments employ similar words: CAL. PEN.
CODE §647(5) (1949) (every idle, lewd, or dissolute person) ; ILL. REV. STAT. c. 37,
§.538 (1936) (any person lewd, wanton, and lascivious in speech or behavior); N.D.
REV. CODE §12-4204(5) (1943) (any person lewd, wanton, or lascivious in speech and
behavior) ; UTAH CODE ANN. §76-61-1(5) (1953) (every idle or lewd or dissolute
person) ; WASH. REV. CODE §9.87.010(7) (1952) (lewd, disorderly or dissolute persons) ;
Wis. STAT. §348.351 (1945) (all persons lewd, wanton, or lascivious in speech or be-
havior) ; D.C. CODE ANN. §22-3302(3) (1951) (immoral or profligate). This is not an
exhaustive list of states with similar provisions.
These vagrancy laws are also directed toward common prostitutes, solicitors, and
frequenters of houses of prostitution. For a comprehensive discussion of these laws, see
Lacey, Vagrancy and Other Crimes of Personal Condition, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1203 (1953).
The writer describes the crime as being classified as a certain type of person. It is a
continuing offense subjecting the person to arrest at any time until he reforms. Id. at 1216.
For a discussion of the California vagrancy law, see Grossman, Who is a Vagrant in
California?, 23 CALIF. L. REV. 506 (1935). This writer sees the law as vesting "a
dangerous discretionary power in the police." Id. at 506. In rebuttal to this article, see
Ames, A Reply to "Who is a Vagrant in California?" 23 CALIF. L. REv. 616 (1935).
This author sees the laws as "a positive necessity for police regulation of those who are,
or might become, a menace to well-ordered society." Id. at 617. In California, one act
of "lewdness" is sufficient to constitute a person a vagrant. People v. Scott, 113 Cal. App.
Supp. 778, 296 P. 601 (1931). In this case a woman who danced in the nude was
adjudged a vagrant. See also People v. Lund, 137 Cal. App. 781, 27 P.2d 958 (1933), in
which a man who lived off the earnings of a prostitute was ruled a vagrant. The
California law also contains a provision that any one who "loiters" near a school or
"annoys and molests" a child is a vagrant. CAL. PEN. CODE §647 a (1) (1949).
12. The disorderly conduct laws serve a function similar to the vagrancy acts in
some states. Like the vagrancy acts these laws vest discretion in the police and other
enforcement officers. E.g., N.Y. PENAL CODE §722. Broad standards such as "offensive
NOTES
prostitution." The most recently added stricture in many states is that
forbidding indecent and lewd behavior with a minor or child. 4 Finally,
there are those laws, both state and federal, directed against the production
and distribution of obscene writings and other such matter. 5
conduct and behavior" are employed. The Illinois law provides that persons "guilty of
open lewdness, disorderly conduct or any other notorious act of public indecency, tending
to debauch the public morals . . ." are guilty of a misdemeanor. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 37,
§.124 (1936).
13. So-called lewd and immoral acts may be punished under the broad provisions
of prostitution laws condemning the committing of "lewdness" or "other immoral
acts." Landrum v. State, 255 P.2d 525 (Okla. 1953).
The notoriously broadened provisions of the Mann Act, which prohibits the trans-
portation of a woman in interstate commerce "for the purpose of prostitution or de-
bauchery or for any other immoral purpose," 36 STAT. 825 (1910), 18 U.S.C. §2421
(1946) (emphasis added), have been used to secure convictions unrelated to commercial
vice. For a general discussion of the United States' Supreme Court's handling of the
Mann Act, see Levi, An Introduction. to Legal Reasoning, 15 U. OF Cni. L. REv. 501,
523-540. In Cleveland v. United States, 329 U. S. 14 (1946), Mormons who took their
wives across state lines were found to be in violation of the law. The Court found the
act applicable not only to commercial vice but to any immorality. Mr. Justice McKenna
in dissent in an earlier case which had extended application of the Act said: "'Immoral'
is a very comprehensive word. It means direliction of morals. In such sense it covers
every form of vice, every form of conduct that is contrary to good order." Caminetti
v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 497 (1916) (dissenting opinion). For a concise discussion
of these cases, see Taylor, Manhandling The Mann Act, 5 NAT. B.J. 39 (1947).
14. One of the recent developments in sex legislation has been the tightened
repression of sexual conduct directed toward children. Among the states which have
enacted such laws in the past two decades are Florida (1943), Idaho (194), Indiana
(1951), Louisiana (1942), Missouri (1949), Ohio (1946), Oklahoma (1947), Texas
(1950). In other states there has been a tendency to increase the penalty for the offense,
e.g., California.
These laws are generally of two types. There are those that are directed strictly
at assaultive conduct and those that broadly prohibit any type of lewd, indecent behavior
with or in the presence of a child. The Indiana Act is illustrative of the first type.
It is in the form of a proviso to the statute dealing with assault and battery and states
that when "in the commission of the offense [assault and battery] any person re-
moves ... or attempts to remove any clothing of any child ...or fondles or caresses
the body . . .of such child who is of the age of 16 years or under . . ." in a manner
which frightens the child and indicates an intent to satisfy the sexual desires of the
assaulter then the penalty shall be one to five years rather than the six month maximum
usually provided for common assault and battery. IND. ANN. STAT. §10-403 (Burns Supp.
1953).
The second type of law is exemplified by the Idaho provision which states: "Any
person who shall wilfully and lewdly commit any lewd or lascivious act or acts upon or
with the body or any part or member thereof of a minor or child under the age of sixteen
years with the intent of arousing . . . or gratifying the lust or passions or sexual
desires of such person or of such minor shall be guilty of a felony. . . ." Idaho CODE
ANN. §18-6607 (Supp. 1952). Similar are the provisions of California, CAL. PEN. CODE
§288 (1949) ; and Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. §563.160 (Vernon 1949).
Adult sexual relations with very young children is truly a problem, but there is a
question whether the laws enacted to cope with it should also deal with the problem of
normal but possibly undesirable sexual relations between young persons of approximately
the same age. For a discussion of adult sexual relations with children, see GuTruTACiiER,
SEX OFrENSEs, 43-44 (1951).
15. State obscenity laws cover a wide range of activities from publishing, printing,
and producing to distributing, or the possession for the purpose of distributing, any
printed matter or other articles of an obscene or immoral nature. The Pennsylvania
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Vagueness in criminal legislation is objectionable for many reasons
which are related to two standard contentions: First, such laws pose
difficulties for enforcement agencies-the police, prosecution, and ju-
diciary-by failing to establish an adequate standard of guidance for ap-
plication of the laws, and, second, such statutes fail to inform persons that
their prospective conduct may be illegal.16
The lack of administrative standard in vague laws is demonstrated
clearly by the modern sexual psychopath acts now existent in some
twenty-three states and the District of Columbia." These special statutes
which are directed at the detection and detention of the dangerous sexual
deviate generally fail to specify a definite criteria for the identification of
such a person." The sexual psychopath is identified either in terms of
an habitual course of sexual misconduct or a lack of power on his part
law in typical fashion condemns any "obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, disgusting, indecent"
book or other printed matter and provides for punishment of those who sell, design, write,
or advertise them. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §4524 (1939). The repression of the obscene
is thus attended by vague and indefinite standards similar to those prevailing in morals
legislation; the purpose is the same: to enhance the moral standard by prohibition of that
which is sex connected.
Federal legislation in this area parallels that of the states and precludes the use
of the mails for the pernicious matter. 36 STAT. 1339 (1911), as amended, 62 STAT. 768
(1948), 18 U.S.C. §1461 (1946).
For a complete and comprehensive treatment of the development of obscenity laws,
see Alpert, Judicial Censorship of Obscene Literature, 52 HARv. L. REV. 40 (1938).
See also Note, Obscenity-Construction and Constitutionality of Statutes Regulating
Obscene Literature, 28 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 877 (1953) ; DRUMMOND, op. cit. supra note 5,
c. 8.
16. Both elements were lacking in State v. Vallery, 212 La. 1095, 34 So.2d 329 (1948),
where a law prohibited any person to cause a child to perform an immoral act. See
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939). The Supreme Court struck down a New
Jersey law providing for a $10,000 fine and a maximum sentence of twenty years for
all those proved to be "gangsters."
For a discussion of vagueness in the law and of the doctrine of "void for vagueness,"
see Aigler, Legislation in Vague Or General Terms, 21 MicH. L. REV. 831 (1923). See
also Harriman, Void for Vagueness Rule In California, 41 CALIF. L. REV. 523 (1953).
17. For a detailed analysis of the sexual psychopath laws of the various states, see
20 CALIF. DEPT. OF MENTAL HYGIENE, FINAL REPORT ON CALIFORNIA SEXUAL DEVIATION
RESEARCH No. 1, 41-58 (1954).
18. The difficulty involved in arriving at an adequate definition of a sexual pyscho-
path arises from the fact that the term "psychopath" has no precise meaning. In May of
1949, the Committee on Forensic Psychiatry of the Group For the Advancement of
Psychiatry warned against the use of the term. The Committee said: "There is still
little agreement on the part of psychiatrists as to the precise meaning of the term.
Furthermore, the term has no dynamic significance. The Committee believes that in
statutes the use of technical terms should be avoided whenever possible. Psychiatric
knowledge and terminology are in a state of flux. Once having become a part of public
law such a term attains a fixity unresponsive to newer scientific knowledge .. "
Behind these sexual psychopath laws is the definite assumption that a sex offender
is distinguishable from other types of criminals. But many writers feel that there is no
basis for this. GUTTMACHER, op. cit. supra note 14, at 131-133; Sunderland, The Sexual
Psychopath Laws, 40 J. OF CRI.N. L. & CRI-MINOLOGY 543 (1950) ; Ludwig, supra note 7,
at 218.
NOTES
to control sexual impulses."0 These definitions imbue the laws with the
quality of habitual offender acts.2"
Because of this vagueness, the enactments are generally limited to
use against minor offenders and not employed to isolate dangerous sex
criminals.2' The laws further become a dangerous and powerful weapon
in the hands of a prosecutor since most persons could be classified as
"sexual psychopaths" depending on who does the diagnosing.22 An un-
fortunate use of the Minnesota law occurred in 1943 when a 42-year-old
father of six children, described as a bright and capable farmer, was found
to be a sexual psychopath on the basis of complaints by his wife that he
demanded excessive sexual relations with her and that upon her refusal
he would masturbate to orgasm. 2' There was no evidence that he was
violent or guilty of anything but desire for normal relations with his wife.
In Michigan, a man described as being of superior intellect was given an
19. The Minnesota law, one of the earliest, provided that "the term 'psychopathic
personality' . . . means the existence in any person of such conditions of emotional
instability or impulsiveness of behavior, or lack of customary standards of good judgment,
or failure to appreciate the consequences of his acts, or combination of such conditions,
as to render such person irresponsible for his conduct with respect to sexual matter
and thereby dangerous to other persons." MINN. STAT. ANN. §526.09 (West 1945).
This act was challenged as being void for indefiniteness but was upheld by the
United States Supreme Court on the basis of a construction by the Minnesota Supreme
Court that the act was meant to apply to "those persons who, by an habitual course of
misconduct in sexual matters, have evidenced an utter lack of power to control their
sexual impulses and who, as a result, are likely to attack or otherwise inflict injury,
loss, pain or evil on the objects of their uncontrolled and uncontrollable desire." Minne-
sota ex. rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 205 Minn. 545, 555, 287 N.W. 297, 302 (1939).
The United States Supreme Court held that this adequately defined the applicability of
the act. 309 U.S. 270 (1940). Other states later included the element of habitual miscon-
duct in their acts. Guttmacher and Weihofen, Sex Offenses, 43 J. OF Cuir. L. & CRIm.-
NOLOGY. 153, 165 (1952). These two writers doubt whether the construction by the
Minnesota court lent definiteness to an inherently indefinite concept. Id. at 165.
20. One writer indicates that the vagueness of the criteria as to what constitutes
a psychopathic person and the inability of the psychiatrists themselves to arrive at an
adequate classification causes the statutes to become habitual sex offender laws. This is
inadequate he points out since "[i]t rests on the assumption that the mere fact that a
man commits sex crimes makes him abnormal mentally and a dangerous sexual psycho-
path." PLOSCOWE, SEX AND THE LAW 228 (1951).
See also Sunderland, supra note 18, at 550. The writer states: "This identification
of an habitual sex offender as a sexual psychopath has no more justification than the
identification of any habitual offender as a psychopath .... The psychiatrists would
almost unanimously object to this definition." Id. at 549.
21. PLoscowE, op. cit. supra note 20, at 229.
22. Sunderland, supra note 18, at 550. Sunderland states that "[t]he vagueness of
the term is indicated by the fact that under the administration of one psychiatrist 98 per
cent of the inmates admitted to the state prison of Illinois were diagnosed as psychopathic
personalities, while in similar institutions with other psychiatrists not more than five
per cent were so diagnosed. Of the sex offenders diagnosed by the Psychiatric Clinic
of the Court of General Sessions in New York City, 15.8 per cent were reported to be
psychopathic, while of sex offenders diagnosed by psychiatrists in Bellevue in New
York City 52.9 per cent were diagnosed as psychopathic." Ibid.
23. Dittrich v. Brown County, 215 Minn. 234, 9 N.W.2d 510 (1943).
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indeterminate sentence under that state's psychopath act after his sixth
conviction for indecent exposure. Three years later his petition for
release was denied,24 notwithstanding that he had received very little
treatment during detention.25 Minor offenses are thus brought quite
readily within the scope of the laws. Playing a part in these applications
of the acts are the long held beliefs that such offenders are all highly
recidivistic and tend to graduate into the ranks of the more serious
offenders.26 Recent research has cast doubt on this theory."
On the other hand, the sexual psychopath laws may not be applied
in the case of an obviously dangerous offender who has committed a
violent crime. In California, a man who was guilty of having kidnapped
five boys, undressing them and torturing them through abuse of their
sexual parts, was held not to come within the purview of the state's psy-
chopath law. 28 His crime was said to be unrelated to the commission of
sexual offenses against children.2 ' The defendant in that case was
effectively segregated by life imprisonment without possibility of parole,
but the act's purpose to provide for treatment and study of such persons
was frustrated.
Use of vague and almost meaningless technical terms such as
"psychopath" in this type of law is matched in the other areas of sex
regulation by the utilization of equally indefinite descriptive terms such as
24. In re Kemmerer, 309 Mich. 313, 15 N.W.2d 652 (1944).
25. The court indicated that the petitioner should remain a prisoner until cured,
possibly for life. Id. at 317, 15 N.W.2d at 653. This case is discussed in PLOSCOWE,
op. cit. supra note 20, at 230. See also People v. Ross, 344 Ill. App. 407, 101 N.E.2d 112
(1951), where a negro was found to be a sexual psychopathic person on the basis of evi-
dence that he had committed acts of sexual "perversion" since the age of seven. The
defendant's witnesses did not deny the perversion but merely testified that he was an
ordinary, normal, and sane individual. The court ruled that no appeal would lie from a
determination by the lower court that the accused was a sexual psychopath.
26. Quite often the statement is made that the sex offender is always highly
recidivistic. Karpman, Considerations Bearing On The Problems of Sexual Offenders,
43 J. CRIm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 13 (1952) ; Schlesinger and Scanlon, Sex Offenders and
the Law, 11 U. oF PiTT. L. Rav. 636, 640-642 (1950). "The rate of recidivism," state these
writers, "among these persons is not coincidence, but a necessary outgrowth of a
psychopathic personality." Id. at 642.
27. See GUTMACHER, op. cit. supra note 14, at 113. "Most people have a mistaken
concept of rescidivism in sex offenses. Certain individual offenders among the exhibi-
tionists, homosexuals and pedophiles have a long series of arrests; but one also finds
certain individual burglars, writers of forged checks and larcenists, who have numerous
convictions for the same offense."
As indicated by the table on recidivism in the Uniform Crime Reports, rape was
twenty-fourth and "other sex offenses" was twenty-fifth in order of recidivism. Id. at
113. ". . . [TIhere is no basis for the common belief that sex criminals engage in sexual
crimes of progressive malignancy. When there is recidivism among sex offenders, it is
not ordinarily found in crimes of sexual violence, but rather in the more purely neurotic
type of behavior. . . ." Id. at 114.
28. People v. Haley, 46 Cal. App. 2d 618, 116 P.2d 448 (1941).
29. Id. at -, 116 P.2d at 501.
NOTES
"immoral," "lewd," "indecent," and "obscene.""0 Besides the acts directed
at more or less specific offenses using this type of language are various
catchall laws prohibiting vagrancy and disorderly conduct which serve
to fill in the statuteless gaps with their nearly unrestricted scope.3' Under
many of them vagrants are defined as lewd, dissolute persons, and dis-
orderly conduct is described as behavior that tends to debauch the public
morals." This type of legislation is objectionable because, being phrased
so broadly, it affords an easy basis for arrest and detention3 and also
makes for indifferent enforcement of the more specific felony statutes. 4
The vagrancy charge in California is added to the specific charge of sex
offense with monotonous regularity, 5 and in Florida the courts allow a
conviction for certain offensive sex behavior, such as indecent exposure,
under the broad provisions of that state's vagrancy law. 6
30. See notes 10 and 15 supra.
31. See notes 11 and 12 supra.
32. Ibid.
33. See Lacey, supra note 11, at 1217. The writer points out that courts and
legislatures frankly recognize that vagrancy and other similar laws are directed toward
potential criminals. "An individual suspected of another crime may be arrested on a
charge of vagrancy so that police will have an opportunity of investigating further or
of securing a voluntary or coerced confession. . . ." Id. at 1218.
This may be desirable, but such laws lend themselves easily to abuse as, for example,
where they are used against minority groups such as negroes or generally to disrupt
political discussions, labor activities, or other activities which may be unpopular with
controlling officials.
Vagrancy and disorderly conduct laws may be a needed police device, see Hall,
Police and Law In A Democratic Society, 28 IND. L.J. 133, 156 (1953), but their coverage
should be limited to prevent excessive abuses.
34. "Because of the many variations from usual criminal procedure peculiar to
crimes of personal condition, it is frequently much easier to obtain convictions of those
offenses. In some jurisdictions vagrancy prosecutions almost wholly supplant prosecutions
for certain types of crimes, usually prostitution and related sex offenses." Lacey, supra
note 11, at 1218-19.
35. Ex parte Keddy, 105 Cal. App.2d 215, 233 P.2d 159 (1951). Defendant here
was convicted of both indecent exposure and vagrancy. The act of indecently exposing
himself rendered him a "lewd and dissolute person." People v. Babb, 103 Cal. App.2d
326, 229 P.2d 843 (1951) (conviction of the infamous crime against nature and also
vagrancy). The court there stated: "One cannot commit the infamous crime against
nature without being lewd and, dissolute. Lewdness and dissoluteness are necessary
elements of that offense." Id. at 330, 229 P.2d at 846.
36. Faulkner v. State, 146 Fla. 769, 1 So.2d 857 (1941). Conviction of being a
vagrant, i.e., a "lewd, wanton and lascivious person," was upheld on appeal where the
evidence of the prosecution indicated that the defendant had exposed a part of his person
in the presence of a female. The conviction could have been for indecent exposure. The
court indicated that there was no possibility of double jeopardy since conviction for
vagrancy obviated possible conviction for indecent exposure. Id. at 770, 1 So.2d at 857.
But the court failed to mention that the crime of which the defendant was convicted
carried a penalty of $250 or six months in jail, FLA. STAT. §856.02 (1951), as com-
pared to $100 or 60 days for indecent exposure. FLA. STAT. §800.03 (1951). The de-
fendant did not raise the question of possible denial of equal protection under the law.
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General confusion can result when ill defined or undefined crimes
overlap in their proscriptions.37 Consider those laws forbidding conduct
amounting to indecent behavior with, or annoyance and molesting of, a
child.3" A number of them fail to distinguish voluntary relations between
the "victim" and the "offender" from those situations involving forcible
and assaultive conduct."0 Because the age of the child is often set quite
high, the statutes amount to a proscription of any conduct approaching
the offense of statutory rape, that is, sexual intercourse with a girl under
the age of consent.4" At the same time, these laws also provide for
punishment of those adults who molest young children." Other crimes,
which are relatively clearly defined, such as assault with intent to commit
rape or sodomy upon a child and the crime of sodomy with a minor, become
entangled in the vague provisions of the acts directed at the prohibition
of lewd and indecent behavior with children. 3 Finally, misdemeanor
offenses such as contributing to the delinquency of a minor are involved
in this assortment of laws directed generally at the proscription of related
harms."
37. There are, of course, those crimes which include elements of other offenses,
e.g., robbery and larceny.
38. See note 14 supra.
39. As indivated in note 14 supra, there are certain of these laws which combine
restriction of voluntary relations between persons of approximately the same age with
prohibitions of molesting of young children by adults.
40. The Louisiana Code, for example, defines indecent behavior with juveniles as
"the commission by anyone over the age of seventeen of any lewd or lascivious act upon
the person or in the presence of any child under the age of seventeen with the intention
of arousing or gratifying the sexual desires of either person." LA. CODE OF CRtm. LAW &
PROC. ANN. art. 81 (1950).
In describing this section's history, there is a comment that "the section is intended
to apply to behavior which falls short of sexual intercourse carried on with young
children." Id. at 493.
41. State v. Saibold, 213 La. 415, 34 So.2d 909 (1948) (adult molesting an eleven
year old child) ; State v. Prejean, 216 La. 1072 So. 2d 627 (1950). Molesting of children
by adults is a crime unrelated to attempts at voluntary intercourse with a girl nearing
the age of seventeen. The latter may be quite natural but socially undesirable conduct;
the former probably indicates perversion.
42. California's law dealing with indecent behavior with children specifically pro-
vides for the inclusion of other crimes of a sexual nature, such as rape and sodomy.
CAL. PEN. CODE §288 (1949). But see the Illinois law which provides that the crime
of indecent behavior with children shall not apply to conduct constituting the crime
of sodomy, rape, and seduction. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 37, §.083 (1936). This exclusionary
proviso limits and clarifies the application of the law.
43. In New York, for example, the crime of carnal abuse of a child often carries
with it the added charge of "impairing the morals of a minor" which is a misdemeanor in
that state. People v. Salacuse, 297 App. Div. 842, 109 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1952) ; People v.
Amerise, 274 App. Div. 987, 82 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1948) ; People v. O'Nody, 296 N.Y. 305,
73 N.E.2d 35 (1947).
In Illinois, the act of having sexual relations with a young girl (seventeen or under)
amounts to contributing to the delinquency of a minor. People v. Kohler, 413 Ill. 283,
109 N.E.2d 210 (1952).
NOTES
Many more sex laws are objectionable because they are so broadly
worded as to bring within their purview activity that could be of an
innocent nature. This type of enactment may use undefined, nonlegal
terminology which does not sufficiently delimit the activity that is to be
The situation which arose in Idaho is strikingly illustrative of this particular
problem. There a recently enacted statute, IDAHO CODE ANN. §18-6607 (Supp. 1953),
making it unlawful for anyone to commit any lewd or lascivious acts upon the body of a
minor with the intent of arousing or gratifying the sexual desires of himself or the
minor became the center of a heated judicial debate. In the case of State v. Evans, 73
Idaho 50, 245 P.2d 788 (1952), an indictment charging a violation of the law was de-
murred to on the ground that the statute unconstitutionally denied equal protection and
due process and inflicted cruel and unusual punishment. Reversing the trial court, the
Supreme Court of Idaho upheld the constitutionality of the act.
The defendant's equal protection argument was that, under the facts presented by the
prosecution, he could have been charged with the crime of assault with the intent to
commit rape, a crime carrying a penalty of from one to fourteen years as compared to
the mandatory life sentence under the act he was charged with violating. The statute
itself provides ". . . for a term of not more than life. . . ." IDAHO CODE ANN. §18-6607
(Supp. 1953); under Idaho law the minimum sentence is abolished and the maximum
must be imposed by the courts subject to parole. This is the so-called indeterminate
sentence. IDAHO CODE ANN. §19-2513 (1947). Counsel for the defendant pointed out that
for a crime of the same nature another person might receive a much lighter sentence
at the discretion of the enforcement officials. State v. Evans, 73 Idaho 50, 55, 245 P.2d
788, 790 (1952). The Idaho Supreme Court rejected the argument by indicating that the
intent necessary in the proof of a commission of the two crimes was different, one
requiring the proof of intent to rape. Id. at 55, 245 P.2d at 791. The court did not
elaborate as to how acts manifesting an intent to rape could be distinguished from those
indicating an intent to engage in lewd and lascivious behavior.
The court also refused to give weight to the due process contention that the words
"lewd" and "lascivious" were so broad in their application as to render the law void for
vagueness. It was admitted that under the phrasing of the statute some enforcement
officers might consider "necking" and "petting" where a child under sixteen was involved
to be a violation of the act. Id. at 59, 245 P. 2d at 793. This did not make the law too
indefinite in the eyes of the majority of the court. They did feel it necessary, however,
to read into the lav a legislative intention to allow the trial judge to set the sentence at
a period less than life contrary to the provisions of the law. Life imprisonment for
"necking" was considered cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 59, 245 P.2d at 793.
Mr. Justice Keeton, in dissent, condemned the court's decision as an improper extension
of the presumption in favor of the validity of a law. Id. at 61, 245 P.2d 795. He con-
sidered it impossible to determine what conduct the particular law was intended to prohibit
since the statute failed to define its terms or fix any standard. He saw only confusion
as the result of attempts to reconcile the act with the main body of sex legislation.
Id. a 63, 245 P.2d 796.
A month later three cases arose under the section. In two of them the Supreme Court
of Idaho upheld the constitutionality of the provision, overruling adverse holdings by the
trial courts. State v. Petty, State v. Deane, 73 Idaho 136, 248 P.2d 218 (1952). It ruled
that lewd and lascivious behavior was a necessarily included offense in the crime of
assault with intent to commit rape and that, therefore, the defendants were properly
charged with both crimes. In the Evans case the same tribunal had found this section to
define a distinguishable offense on the basis of the different specific intents needed in
proof of the violations. It is also interesting to note that the "necessarily included
offense" carries a much more severe maximum punishment than the major crime of
assault.
In the third case the defendant was ruled to have been properly charged with sodomy
in one count and lewd and lascivious behavior on the body of a child under sixteen in
another. State v. Wrall, 73 Idaho 142, 248 P.2d 222 (1952). Again, the court was required
to reverse a trial court ruling that the law was unconstitutional. Mr. Justice Keeton,
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prohibited. Thus, laws forbidding loitering44 around schools or peeping4
into windows can be objected to as overly broad. In each the element of
mens rea, the specific intent usually essential to criminality, is lacking
since not all loitering nor all peeping can be considered criminal.
The way in which a poorly worded law can be twisted in its applica-
tion is indicated by a recent Florida case in which a forty-seven year old
father of seven children and owner of a neighborhood shoe store fre-
quented by many children was convicted of making an indecent assault
upon a child and sentenced to two and a half years at hard labor.4 The
strongest case for the prosecution was that the convicted man had put his
arm around the girl and had called her a "little sweetie." He testified
that he was merely attempting to keep the child away from the machines
located in the shop. On appeal this conviction was reversed. The court
stated that "the evidence of the prosecutrix shows that his [defendant's]
approach to her was fatherly" rather than assaultive 7 But the entire
affair probably left doubts lurking in the minds of many mothers in this
particular neighborhood. Moreover, the embarrassment, expense, and
loss of business resulting from the necessity of defending against such
charges must be considered.4"
A sizeable objection to the vagueness of these laws is that their
semantic gaps leave room for infringement of constitutional rights. The
rights to free speech, due process, and equal protection may be denied;
a group of recent decisions illustrate this. In a California case, a man who
who dissented from all the court's holdings, said in conclusion to his final dissent: "I
referred to the confusion that would arise in attempting to uphold this statute . . . in
the case of State v. Evans. . . I now think the confusion is with us." Id. at 142, 248
P.2d at 229. The same confused application can result in other jurisdictions depending
on how vaguely the laws proscribing indecent assaults on children are phrased.
44. CAL. PEN. CODE §647 a(2) (1949). (Every person who loiters around a school
is a vagrant.)
45. ALA. CODE tit. 14, §436(1) (Supp. 1951). This section provided that: "Any
male person who goes near and stares, gazes or peeps into any room, apartment, chamber
or other place of abode, not his own or under his control, which is occupied by a female
person . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor ... "
In Kahalley v. State, 254 Ala. 482, 48 So.2d 794 (1950), the Alabama Supreme Court
invalidated the above statute because of vagueness. The court said: "A state must so
write its penal statutes as to be not so vague and indefinite as to permit the punishment
of innocent acts and conduct which are a part of thei right of every citizen to pursue as
well as acts evil in nature and affected with public interest." Id. at 484, 48 So.2d at 796.
This court also invalidated a city ordinance of Birmingham which made it unlawful
for any two persons of the opposite sex, except husband and wife or parent and minor
child to jointly and privately occupy any room in a hotel. Connor v. City of Birmingham,
257 Ala. 588, 60 So.2d 479 (1952).
46. Boles v. State, 158 Fla. 220, 27 So.2d 293 (1946).
47. Id. at 222, 27 So.2d at 294.
48. For a discussion of other cases involving this situation of an innocent man
injured through the broadness of the scope of these laws, see CAIF. DEPT. OF MENTAL
HYGIENE, op. cit. supra note 17, at 34 et seq.
NOTES
was politically unpopular with Los Angeles city officials was convicted
of vagrancy as a "dissolute" person.49 Conviction was affirmed because
of the defendant's default on appeal."
Those state and federal acts and city ordinances dealing with the
prohibition of various obscene and offensive matters work similar harms
in regard to the freedom of expression via the written word.5 1 One
zealous police chief used the particular ordinance of his city to coerce
bookdealers to remove from their stock certain named volumes which
his vice squad decided were obscene or immoral within the meaning of
49. The defendant in this case was a communist. In his petition to the Supreme
Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari he was described as a common figure
at Pershing Square where he spoke often on political and economic matters. He had
been arrested sixty-three times within the space of a few years. Thirteen times formal
bookings were made on various charges. Once he was charged with the offense of
defacing public property in connection with his standing on a thick cement bench. Brief
for Petitioner, p. 4, Edelman v. California, 344 U.S. 357 (1953).
Edelman was here convicted under CAL. PEN. CODE §347 (5) (1949). (Every idle,
or dissolute, or lewd person is a vagrant.)
50. Default was due to the fact that Edelman's substitute attorney was notified too
late to take an appeal. The Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari on the
ground that there was no decision by the highest court of the state construing the statute
which the petitioner contended to be violative of his right to free speech because of its
vagueness which allowed a discriminatory enforcement against him. The convicted had
recourse, it was held, to habeas corpus to test the constitutionality of the restraint imposed
upon him. Edelman v. California, 344 U.S. 357 (1953).
Mr. Justice Black, who was joined by Mr. Justice Douglas, dissented on the ground
that the law was excessively vague. The Justice thought it necessary for the Court to
consider possibilities of discrimination against the petitioner and of infringement of his
right to free speech. He cautioned against allowing this type of dragnet legislation used
to abridge public discussion to go unexamined. Id. at 365.
From an inspection of the record, it would seem that the trial court had noted the
failure of the state to establish sexual immorality on the part of Edelman and had in-
structed in vague generalizations that Edelman was guilty as charged if found to be
"lawless" or "loosed from restraint." Transcript of Record, pp. 46-47, Edelman v. Cali-
fornia, 344 U.S. 357 (1953).
51. No one can with assurance say what will or will not be considered "obscene."
The approach used in a recent Kentucky proceeding shows none of the specificity gen-
erally present in a criminal case. The court quoted with approval from an earlier case
the following: "A publication, writing, or picture might be so lascivious or obscene as
to shock every sense of common decency, and leave no doubt in the mind of any person of
ordinary morality that it would have a tendency to debase and corrupt the thoughts of
those into whose hands it might fall. On the other hand, a writing, picture, or paper
might be of such a character as to make it a matter of doubt whether it was indecent or
obscene, depending upon the mental and moral training and characteristics of the person
who came to pass judgment upon it. So that, when there is doubt in the mind of any
ordinarily upright, well-balanced person as to whether or not a publication comes within
the meaning of the statute, it is proper to submit the question to the jury. But if, as in
the case before us, the matter at first impression, confirmed by more careful considera-
tion, appears to be entirely free from the vice the statute was designed to suppress, the
court should either sustain a demurrer to the indictment or direct a verdict of acquittal."
King v. Commonwealth, 313 Ky. 741, 745, 233 S.W.2d 522, 524 (1950).
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the ordinance.5" Those dealers who refused to comply faced the possibility
of one hundred dollar fines or thirty days imprisonment or both."5 Com-
pliance was axiomatic since they were not eager to invite public censure.
This was especially so because no one could foretell what would or would
not be found obscene under such laws. On suit by a publisher, who was
injured by this type of enforcement, a federal district court enjoined the
activities of the police but refused to declare the ordinance itself invalid."'
Vague sex statutes also open up possibilities for denial of equal pro-
tection under the laws when a member of a minority group is implicated.
In a recent Oklahoma case indicating such discrimination, the conviction
of a negro for an act of lewdness was upheld on appeal to the Criminal
Court of Appeals of that state.5 The defendant was found in a private
office caressing a white woman and kissing her on the neck. Prejudice
against the negro was obvious from the very wording of the indictment
which needlessly charged that "defendant, being a negro, was holding
the right breast of a white woman. ,y56 The judge of the
appellate court stated that this could be treated as mere surplusage to be
cured by a motion to strike the words "being a negro" and "white."57
52. New American Library of World Literature v. Allen, 114 F Supp. 823 (N.D.,
Ohio 1953). The Youngstown, Ohio, Chief of Police seems to have initiated the procedure
and was later assisted by the Federated Woman's Clubs of Youngstown.
53. Id. at 828.
54. The district court rejected the petitioner's argument that the Supreme Court of
the United States, in Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952), had repudiated "its pre-
vious hasty dictum" in Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948), upholding the word
"obscene" as sufficiently definite for use in this type of criminal statute. The Burstyn
holding was that the interest m allowing the people to see certain kinds of motion pictures
outweighed that of protecting religions from "sacrilegious" attacks. The word "sac-
rilegious" was also held too vague to constitute an adequate administrative standard for
censorship of movies. This limited holding did not invalidate use of the words "immoral"
and "obscene" in criminal legislation which has the purpose of protecting public morals.
The district court cited a 1914 Supreme Court holding that the word "immoral" was
a sufficiently clear standard in movie censorship. Mutual Film Corp. v. Ohio Industrial
Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230 (1914). However, in January of 1954, the Court in a per curiai
decision declared a similar Ohio law unconstitutional along with a New York act which
enabled a certain board of regents to ban "immoral" films. Superior Films Inc. v. Dep't
of Education of Ohio, Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the University of the
State of New York, 346 U.S. 587 (1954). The Court's holdings in these cases are all
phrased in narrow terms, and it would be unwise to generalize on the basis of them as
to the validity of use of such terms as "obscene, immoral, and indecent" in this type of
legislation. For a discussion of the latest cases, see Note, 102 U. OF PA. L. REv. 671
(1954).
55. Landrum v. State, 255 P.2d 525 (Okla. 1953).
56. Id. at 528.
57 Ibid. The court said. "The color or race of the participants is not involved in
a consideration of the charge. It would not make any difference under the statute
whether the participants were all white, all black or white and black as in this case."
This language covered an untenable extension of the law involved. It is obvious that the
statute in question would not be enforced against a white couple or a negro couple who
were as careful in their behavior as the one involved here. See note 61 infra.
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The prosecution was brought under the vague provisions of the state's
prostitution law 8 rather than under the act forbidding all conduct "which
openly outrages public decency and is injurious to public morals." 9 The
reason for this was that the latter crime, which is itself very loosely drawn,
requires the element of public display The prosecution was able to fall
back on the prostitution law because of its general prohibition of "lewd-
ness." For all practical purposes "lewdness" remains undefined by the
act. It is simply indicated that lewdness is "to include the making of any
appointment or engagement for prostitution or lewdness or any act in
furtherance of such appointment or engagement."60 It seems highly
incongruous that an act directed at the punishment of commercial prostitu-
tion or the indiscriminate giving of the body for free should be used to
fit the particular facts of this case."'
The trial of the sex offense and the sex related violation is emotion
packed for the most impartial of judges and juries. Excessive vagueness
fails to provide a restraint on emotion. Prejudice against the defendant
can enter at any step of the proceedings, and little can be done to preserve
this in the record for appeal to a higher court. The danger in these laws
is basically that the morality they try to express in a legal form is a
shifting concept that changes from time to time and from place to place.62
58. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §1029 (1951). This Act provides in part that it shall be
unlawful "to solicit, induce, entice or procure another to commit an act of lewdness,
assignation, or prostitution with himself or herself."
59. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §22 (1951).
60. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §1030 (1951).
61. Prostitution is defined by this Act " to include the giving or receiving of
the body for sexual intercourse for hire, and shall also be construed to include the giving
or receiving of the body for indiscriminate sexual intercourse without hire." OKLA. STAT.
tit. 21, §1030 (1951).
Neither of these elements was present in this case. The vague word "lewdness,"
undefined except for the even more indefinite phrase indicated in the text, was construed
completely out of context to cover conduct unrelated to acts of prostitution and assigna-
tion.
See Coleman v. Commonwealth, 247 S.W.2d 535 (Ky. 1952). In this case it was
proved that a negro and white girl had often been seen with each other. The appellate
court reversed a conviction for common law lewdness stating that. "The gravamen of
the charge against Coleman is the performance of an act in public which, in itself, was
lewd. The fact that he was a negro and Miss Nance a white woman does not alter this
requirement." Id. at 536. The Landrum case would have been similarly disposed of had
it not been for judicial extension of the vague law dealing with prostitution.
62. The changes which occur in moral standards can best be indicated by reference
to a 1913 Oklahoma decision in which the act of publicly wagering on the outcome of a
baseball game was held to have "grossly disturbed the public peace, openly outraged
public decency and injured public morals." State v. Lawrence, 9 Okla. Crim. Rep. 16,
130 Pac. 508 (1913). The judge in affirming the conviction said "A wager laid upon
the result of a contest of chance constitutes gaming. Mr. Blackstone says it is an
offense of the most alarming nature, tending by necessary consequence to promote idle-
ness, theft, debauchery among those of the lower class, and that among persons of
superior rank it has frequently been attended with sudden ruin. " Id. at -, 130 Pac.
at 509.
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Each judge, indeed each juror, is left to determine the applicable standard
of morality and decency, which will thus vary with the different arbi-
trators of fact and law. This is truly government by men rather than by
laws.
The sex laws are vague for various reasons. One fairly obvious
factor which is involved throughout the criminal law is that, with the
great increase in the complexity of life and relationships with others in
large urban areas, there has been a demand for greater regulation of
every aspect of human behavior and repression of more and more conduct
as patently antisocial. 8 This is illustrated in the sex law area by the
increase in the number of statutes prohibiting so-called indecencies with
minors.64 For several years there has been a growing tendency on the
part of legislatures to employ broad standards-a big net which scoops
in possible violators and leaves to the judiciary the task of screening out
the guilty. Coincident with this development is an increasingly hardened
attitude toward the criminally involved person. The fear that the innocent
might be wrongfully punished has become overshadowed by the fear that
Divergence in attitudes as to what constitutes obscenity is illustrated by two cases
recently decided in Ohio and Georgia. In the Ohio proceeding, certain magazines which
the prosecution considered "so indecent that it would be improper to place them in the
records of this court" were found not to be obscene. State v. Lerner, 81 N.E.2d 282 (Ohio
1948). The judge of the court of common pleas found nothing per se obscene about the
nude human body. Id. at 292. "Pure normal sex ideas are all right, all of mankind have
sex ideas. Nature is aflame with sex ideas." Id. at 286.
The other case involved prosecution for the display of a motion picture of an obscene
nature. The judge affirming the trial court's ruling that the picture was obscene, stated:
"'The Valley of the Nude' pictured a place where men and women and children were play-
ing and living in the nude, exposing their persons to one another, eating, playing, sleeping
together-naked. In our opinion it was in violation of the statute." State v. Gore, 79
Ga. App. 696, 707, 54 S.E.2d 669, 676 (1949). This same picture was shown without
objection in three or four other states. Clearly, the "obscene" exists in the mind.
63. This increased generality in laws was noted as much as three decades ago. See
Aigler, supra note 16, at 831.
See also People v. Commonwealth Sanitation Co., 107 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1951), where
a city magistrate's court of the City of New York said: "As a general proposition, it is
true that the criminal law should be definite and certain and that it should be possible
for any one to know what is and what is not criminal before he acts. Nullum crimen
sine lege is a basic principle of the criminal law of the Western World. Unfortunately
the myriad forms of socially dangerous or socially objectionable behavior do not lend
themselves to meticulous definitions. The criminal law must operate in large areas of
objectionable behavior with general standards and through general criteria." Id. at 985.
It should be noted, however, that the court there dealt with a law which made it an
offense either knowingly or negligently to do any act which would be dangerous to life
and detrimental to the health of any human being. This measure can be considered a
criminal law only in the loosest sense of the word. It is a regulatory provision requiring
maintenance of sanitary conditions and prescribing an exactment of a fine in case of
violation. The law amounts to what some writers term a "civil offense." Perkins, The
Civil Offense, 100 U. oF PA. L. REV., 832 (1952).
64. See note 14 supra.
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one guilty person might elude the law's strictures." Wide discretion is
given the courts under acts aimed at generally unacceptable conduct.
Proponents of this type of criminal law argue persuasively that in
the light of varied forms which offensive conduct can take, the legislature
should not be required to define and denounce specifically that behavior
considered to be a crime."0 This contention in the last analysis is that the
legislature should continue to remake the criminal law to fit the need for
general denunciation of antisocial conduct. But this argument is basically
unsound. Under this approach, the legislature abandons its task of
definitively proscribing conduct which intentionally results in harm.
This matter is left to the court; the consequence is a general condemnation
of all that offends the state."7
In reality there is no need for the provisions to be so general. When
the legislature considers itself inadequate to define effectively the behavior
it wishes to proscribe, the question that it should pose is whether there is
an actual harm involved and what conduct and intent cause the harm.
After considering these factors, it may realize that to a great extent there
is no substantial harm involved which could not be handled with specificity
and that by enacting a general law it condemns a great deal which causes
no such harm. Thus those laws aimed generally at openly lewd and
lascivious behavior now bring within their scope acts that offend public
decency by shocking observers. Tort law as a general rule does not allow
recompense for mental anguish resulting from either a negligent or
intentional act unless there is some physical injury or great mental dis-
turbance."8 It does not seem that the criminal law should be ready to
secure the mental well being of all individuals.
65. See CALIF. DEPT. OF MENTAL HYGIENE, op. cit. supra. note 17, at 34.
66. One writer puts forth the argument for a general code of laws in the following
manner: "Offenses of this kind [sexual misconduct] may be committed through a wide
variety of conduct, and it is not to be expected that the legislature will undertake the
cumbersome and probably impossible task of providing for all detailed violations in
advance." Note, Constitutional Law-Crindial Law--Statutory Construction and Interpre-
tation, 8 LA. L. REv. 129, 132 (1947). He continues in defense of a certain section of
the Louisiana Code struck down by the courts as being too vague: "The avowed inten-
tion of the reporters and of the legislature in enacting Article 104 of the Criminal Code
was to draft a general definition which would include all types of disorderly houses and
places known as such, or which might become known as such in the future." Ibid.
A draftsman of the Louisiana Code stated that: "The choice of general phrasing is
largely responsible for the success of civilian legislation; the lack of it is the greatest
single defect in Anglo-American legislation. . . ." Morrow, Civilian Codification Under
Judicial Review: The Generality of "Immorality" in Louisiana, 21 TUL. L. REv. 545, 550
(1947).
67. Legislation would become a matter of vesting complete discretion in certain men
to punish all offenders of a general code. This is a typically totalitarian disregard for
the democratic safeguard of specificity in criminal law. See note 7 supra.
68. PROSSER, TORTS 51, 210 (1941).
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A second cause of the vagueness in sex legislation is the tendency
of the laws to confound sin with crime. Present day legal restrictions are
based on a Judeo-Christian conception of morality--a legalistic code
setting the bounds of decent human behavior. 9 Both the moral and the
penal codes have suffered in the exchange.7
The question is raised as to whether or not the legislature should
continue to recognize a substantial community interest in maintaining a
sex-moral standard through criminal law. Some authorities, while fully
recognizing the shortcomings of this legislation, still maintain that the
criminal law should educate morally.71 This argument is based on the
assumed immorality of deviant sexual behavior and indicates a great
faith that the penal sanction can influence for the better "the general
moral climate of the community. 7 2
While basically the criminal law may have a foundation of absolute
moral standards, the social customs which pass under the guise of morals
and are imposed on the general public replete with penal sanctions should
be recognized as nothing more than conventions. They should be pre-
served, perhaps, but not by a criminal statute unless its provisions are
specifically directed at a serious legal harm. An improvement of the
moral tone of the community can be approached apart from criminal
jurisprudence."
Another cause of vagueness in sex legislation is that the laws repre-
sent, to a large extent, hastily enacted sops to the public demands for
protection from the real or imagined thousands of sex fiends which are
69. For a discussion of the .development of our sex laws, see MAY, SOCIAL CONTROL
Or SEX EXPRESSION (1931), especially at 256. See also DRUMIIMOND, op. cit. supra note 5.
70. Morals have achieved a connotation of sexual purity to be enforced with penal
sanction. A minister commenting on the effect of the Kinsey report sees a possible re-
generation of the concept of morality as some thing other than a legalistic code. See
Gill, Sin and Sex, in SEX LIFE OF THE AMERICAN WOMAN AND THE KINSEY REPORT 79(Ellis ed. 1953). "The moral life," he commented, "is not the life that is made to fit the
legalistic box, forced to lie along the pattern of convention and custom. The moral life
is . . . a life lived in a loving, creative, productive, harmonizing . . .direction." Id. at
90-91.
71. See Ludwig, supra note 7, at 209.
72. Schwartz, supra note 2, at 916. This position is that the criminal law should
pose an ideal standard of conduct to set the pattern for human conduct. It should be
noted that this ideal standard opens the door to blackmail; see Note, Post-Kinsey: Vohln-
tary Sex Relations as Criminal Offenses, 17 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 162, 178 n.78 (1949).
73. Schwartz in his book review of the Kinsey report argues that because human
conduct does not align itself with our criminal law standards is no reason for discarding
the laws. Many persons lie, but we still retain our perjury laws. Schwartz, supra note 2,
at 916. But Schwartz does not carry his analogy far enough. The perjury laws are
aimed at a specific harm caused by certain defined conduct. The same cannot be said of
sex statutes which attempt to maintain a moral standard.
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pictured by some writers as loose in this country today.7 4 One sadistic
murder of a child or woman is all that is needed to make every stranger
in a given neighborhood suspect as a degenerate, sex killer. One effect
of these scares is an increase in the body of statutes which represent
endeavors by the legislature to isolate and treat thedangerous sex deviate
but which in the end serve only to clutter up the collection of minor
sex regulations. Laws serve the purpose of satisfying the people's demands
for the "something which has to be done about it."
In considering what can be done about excessive vagueness in these
laws, the possibility which immediately occurs is judicial condemnation
of legislation for indefiniteness. The void for vagueness doctrine has
become thoroughly entrenched both as a constitutional and criminal law
principle.7" The suggestion is often voiced that the courts should refrain
from striking down legislation on the sole basis of vagueness,"6 and, as a
general rule, they are reluctant to do so." The Supreme Court of the
United States will not void state legislation without allowing an opportu-
nity for the highest court of the state to place a saving construction upon
74. Writers have pointed out that the danger to our citizens from the sex criminal
has been greatly exaggerated. See Sunderland, supra note 18, at 543; Symposium, The
Challenge of the Sex Offender, 22 MENTAL HYGIENE 1 (1938).
75. See Aigler, supra note 16, for a discussion of the development of the constitu-
tional principle of "void for vagueness." For a discussion of the doctrine as inherent in
the criminal law principle of legality, see HALL, op. cit. supra note 6, c. 2.
76. See Note, Void For Vagueness: An Escape from Statutory Interpretation, 23
IND. L.J. 272 (1948). See also Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Winters v. New York,
333 U.S. 507 (1948).
77. Ordinarily, when a law is invalidated more than a lack of due process because of
vagueness is offered as justification. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948), in-
volved an invasion of the right to free speech as did Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495
(1948), and Superior Films Inc. v. Dep't of Education of Ohio, Commercial Pictures
Inc. v. Regents of the University of the State of New York, 346 U.S. 587 (1954). The
free speech argument was also the basis of the decision in Herndon v. Lowery, 301 U.S.
242 (1937), where the Court invalidated a law making it criminal to advocate certain
political ideals.
The court did strike down a New Jersey statute which made it a crime to be a
"gangster" because it failed to define that term. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451
(1939).
Courts generally will look to the common law background of words to give them
meaning and uphold acts wherever possible. In State v. Magaha, 182 Md. 122, 32 A.2d
477 (1943), the court found nothing vague about the requirement of "reasonable care"
in driving. The court said: "The term 'reasonable care' is a familiar expression in
common speech and in the terminology of the law. Its accepted meaning is that degree
of care which a person of ordinary prudence would exercise under similar circumstances."
Id. at 130, 32 A.2d at 481. On the same basis, the United States Supreme Court found
nothing vague in the term "moral turpitude." Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951).
Similarly, laws employing words such as "lewd, obscene, immoral" may be validated be-
cause of common law backgrounds which the laws acquired in their development in con-
junction with Christian concepts of morality. Supra note 69, and text. Cf. Wintersya.
New York 333 U.S. 507, 517-518 (1948).
For a discussion of the approach by courts to legislation under the doctrine, see
Harriman, supra note 16.
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the act." In a rare case in which the' Court did strike down a state law
which was directed toward repressing sex and criminal literature, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, in dissent, expressed fear for a multitude of local
laws endangered by such an approach."9 The enactments he cited were
not only numerous but cover areas long considered proper for state
legislation under the police power. There is little likelihood that the Court
will ever begin a wholesale attack on such statutes. Neither do develop-
ments on the state level indicate that the courts are eager to force a
revamping of these laws or that legislatures would welcome such an en-
deavor.8"
The shortcomings of sex legislation are so basic that they cannot
be cured by the judiciary in constitutional attacks for indefiniteness.
Each separately considered law can generally be upheld against the charges
of vagueness because usually each judge can fairly well categorize that
which he considers to be obscene, lewd or indecent and fails to see the
78. Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95 (1948). This case involved a Utah statute making
it a crime to conspire to "commit any act injurious to the public health, to public morals,
or to trade or commerce. . . ." UTAH ComE ANN. §103-11-1 (1943). A group of
Mormons were convicted under the law for conspiring to advocate polygamy. State v.
Musser, 110 Utah 534, 175 P.2d 724 (1946). The United States Supreme Court remanded
the case stating that "[w]hat the statutes of a State mean, the extent to which any
provision may be limited by other Acts or by other parts of the same Act, are questions
on which the highest court of the State has the final word. The right to speak this word
is one which State courts should jealously maintain and which we should scrupulously
observe." Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 98 (1948).
79. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 522 (1948).
80. Only in a few states has there been any notable activity. In Louisiana, three
articles of a recently enacted criminal code were invalidated by the supreme court of
that state. In State v. Truby, 211 La. 178, 29 So.2d 758 (1947), a law defining a dis-
orderly house as any place used for "any . . . immoral purpose" was found too indefinite
because the morality of the people did not serve as a sufficient guide to administration
of the law nor did it provide adequate warning of illegality to persons subject to its
provisions. A provision forbidding any person to cause a child to perform an "immoral"
act was found similarly invalid in State v. Vallery, 212 La. 1095, 34 So.2d 329 (1948).
In State v. Kraft, 214 La. 351, 37 So.2d 815 (1948), a law forbidding the possession of
an indecent print or film was voided. But the court stopped short of invalidating an act
forbidding the commission of "indecent" behavior with a juvenile. State v. Saibold, 213
La. 415, 34 So.2d 909 (1948).
In Alabama, the supreme court recently invalidated a statute and a city ordinance
involving the regulation of sexual conduct. See note 45 supra. California has had several
recent cases in which legislation has been struck down by the courts, but this is generally
in the area of business regulation. See Harriman, supra note 16. Recently, however,
the court of that state found adequate a statute which defined as a vagrant all persons
who should "annoy or molest" children. People v. Pallares, 112 Cal. App2d 895, 246
P.2d 173 (1952).
The hesitancy with which courts strike down vague laws is illustrated in Musser v.
State, 223 P.2d 193 (Utah 1950) (on remand from the United States Supreme Court, see
note 78 supra), where the high court of Utah finally invalidated the statute involved there
after finding that "[nlo language in this or any other statute of the state or law thereof
or any historical fact or surrounding circumstance connected with the enactment of this
statute has been pointed to as indicating that the legislature intended any limitation
thereon other than that expressed on the face . . ." of the law. Id. at 194.
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possibility of any wide departure from his conception of the content of
these legally descriptive terms. When courts do strike down vague
statutes, the laws that are enacted to replace them are seldom an improve-
ment.8 As long as this attitude of working at cross purposes prevails,
"void for vagueness" will serve only as a limited remedy for the ills
created by inadequate sex-morals legislation.
The sex laws' basic fault lies in their failure to state adequately an
over-all purpose apart from the preservation of an ideal level of conduct
through the repression of all that deviates from the ideal. The statutes
in tending to ignore facts of actual human sexual behavior represent an
unrealistic approach to sex-created problems. The assumption inherent
in them that the sexual needs of individuals are basically the same and
that each will find it a relatively simple matter to conform to a single
pattern imposed by convention has been cast out by research.8 2 Many
factors-psychological, physiological, economic, and cultural-are recog-
nized as playing a part in the differentiation of sexual behavior.83
Failing to acknowledge this, the laws continue to treat as nearly
synonymous sex, immorality, and illegality. Because of this the acts
become vulnerable to the criticism that they represent little more than
a codification of the prejudices of predominant social and economic
groups.
To meet these criticisms they should be basically altered to assume a
role in a program designed to accomplish positive fitting and subordinat-
ing of the sexual pattern of the individual's life to the social and economic
pattern of society. What is needed is a new approach to the problems
created by offensive sexual conduct: one of education rather than repres-
sion and condemnation. The readjustment of individual attitudes to
sexual matters is, of course, more than a legislative problem. Perhaps it
will be impossible to accomplish in light of the many psychological com-
plications of the human mind.84 But the more immediate objective of the
81. In Louisiana, the statutes invalidated (see note 80 supra) were promptly replaced
with meaningless amendments. The two sections containing the invalidly broad "im-
moral" were amended to read "sexually immoral." LA. CODE CRIM. LAw & PRoc. art. 92,
§7, 104. (Supp. 1953). The indecent print or film became any print or film portraying
"any act of lewdness or indecency, grossly scandalous and tending to debauch the morals
and manners of the people." LA. CODE Cvanr. LAw & PROC. art. 106 (Supp. 1953). This
latter phrase is -more colorful if not more helpful. None of these provisions have been
tested before the supreme court of the state.
82. KINSEY, POMEROY AND MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE
196-197 (1948).
83. See note 2 supra.
84. It is doubtful whether human sexual conduct can ever be relegated to the posi-
tion of any other physiological function of the human body in the manner described by
Aldous Huxley in his novel, Brave New World (1932). This was a world in which
frustrations, neuroses and all human ills were conquered by scientific advance, but yet a
frightening world devoid of thought and emotion.
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legislature should be a reconstruction of existing laws. Those that prohibit
offensive conduct should not make behavior illegal merely because it
tends to affront certain people. Legislators should discontinue the pic-
turesque but not too helpful characterization of offensive conduct as
"immoral," "lewd," "lascivious," and "indecent." These words readily
call forth subjective standards of application. The laws protecting minors
from harmful behavior on the part of adults should be confined to the
prohibition of adult sexual violation of very young children. Legislation
restricting obscenity should be clarified to prevent the possibility of
infringement of the right to free speech. The notion that criminals are
created from the readers of such matter should not be so readily accepted.
These laws should have a definite standard directed toward the prohibition
of that material which has only one object and that being the portrayal
of the pornographic. The legislature should state precisely what types of
matter are considered objectionable and should know, in terms of sub-
stantial harm, why this is so.
There is much that needs to be done in the area of criminal sex regula-
tion. The stopgap efforts to repress the immorality of man should be
discontinued in favor of a realistic consideration of the over-all sex
question. Legislation will not solve all the multitudinous problems, but
one step in the direction of a mature policy toward what is considered
offensive behavior is a recodification of the laws to accomplish intelligent
regulation of voluntary sex behavior and minor sex offenses.
PUBLIC OR PRIVATE POWER-RESPONSIBILITES OF THE FPC
Current development of the nation's water power is set in a maze of
overlapping and sometimes conflicting jurisdictions.' Congress has dele-
gated much of its authority over waters to various administrative agencies.
The Federal Power Commission exercises dominion over power rights.2
1. For a survey of the development of governmental supervision and the present
jurisdiction of certain governmental agencies over various aspects of water control, see
3 REPORT PRESIDENT'S WATER RESOURCES POLICY CommI'N 5-348 (1950).
2. "For the first time, the Act of 1920 [41 STAT. 1063 (1920), 16 U.S.C. §791 et seq.
(1946)] established a national policy in the use and development of water power on public
lands and navigable streams." Pinchot, The Long Struggle for Effective Federal Water
Power Legislation, 14 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 9, 19 (1945). Prior to 1920, private parties
interested in developing sites under federal jurisdiction introduced bills into Congress;
Congressional approval was almost an automatic matter. Id. at 11. President Theodore
Roosevelt played an important.part in putting a stop to this type of enactment. He felt
that the then current Congressional practice amounted to giving away the property of the
people. Gatchell, The Role of the FPC in Regional Development, 32 IowA L. REv. 283,
